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IN WASHINGTON STATE, OPEN COURTS
JURISPRUDENCE CONSISTS MAINLY OF OPEN
QUESTIONS
Anne L. Ellington* and Jeanine Blackett Lutzenhiser**
Abstract: Issues of public trial and the open administration of justice have been an intense
focus of the Washington State Supreme Court in recent years. In its December issue, the
Washington Law Review surveyed U.S. and Washington State public trial and public access
jurisprudence, and made recommendations for clarifying the constitutional issues involved
when a courtroom “closure” occurs. Just before that issue went to press, the Washington
State Supreme Court decided four important public trial cases: State v. Sublett, State v. Wise,
State v. Paumier, and In re Morris. The court issued fourteen separate opinions, clearly
demonstrating deep divisions among the justices. This follow-up article examines the
principal arguments of the new opinions, identifies what areas appear settled, and discusses
the important questions that remain unresolved.
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INTRODUCTION
Patrick Morris was convicted of sex crimes against his daughter.1
Michael Sublett went to prison for premeditated murder.2 Both Eric

1. In re Morris, 176 Wash. 2d 157, 161, 288 P.3d 1140, 1142 (2012).
2. State v. Sublett, 176 Wash. 2d 58, 65, 292 P.3d 715, 718 (2012).

10 - Ellington & Lutzenhiser Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

2013]

6/17/2013 1:57 PM

WASHINGTON’S OPEN COURTS JURISPRUDENCE

493

Wise and Rene Paumier were convicted of burglary.3 What do these
defendants have in common? At some point during their trials, a
procedure was conducted in chambers instead of the public courtroom,
thereby implicating both the constitutional right of each defendant to a
public trial and the constitutional right of the public to the open
administration of justice. In each case, the procedures were routine,
longstanding practices, and the defendants made no objection. Each
challenged the practice for the first time on appeal.
On November 21, 2012, the Washington State Supreme Court
announced its decisions in these four cases. Of the four defendants, only
Sublett’s conviction was affirmed. In the other three cases, the Court
reversed for violation of the defendant’s public trial right and ordered
new trials.
The four decisions comprise fourteen separate opinions. Only two
cases garnered a majority (both 5-4); in the others, a lead opinion was
accompanied by either three separate concurrences or one concurrence
and two separate dissents.
In its December issue (which went to press the week the four
decisions were released), the Washington Law Review surveyed U.S. and
Washington State public trial and public access jurisprudence (including
three of these four cases at the intermediate appellate court level), and
made recommendations for clarifying the constitutional and prudential
issues involved.4 This article examines whether the new decisions have
clarified the analytical approach, concludes they have not, and attempts
to identify the areas in which the law is settled and the issues the Court
has yet to resolve. Because these include the proper analytical
framework for both trial and review, and involve issues that may arise in
any criminal case, consensus as to the correct approach will greatly
contribute to the interests of justice.
Part I summarizes the constitutional rights implicated by exclusion of
the public from court proceedings. Part II recaps the course of
Washington public trial and open access jurisprudence. Part III analyzes
the different opinions in the four recent cases, and highlights the
persistent (and so far intractable) disagreements among the justices. Part
IV identifies the areas in which agreement is most urgently needed so
that trial courts are able to safeguard the important constitutional
interests at issue.
3. State v. Wise, 176 Wash. 2d 1, 6, 288 P.3d 1113, 1115 (2012); State v. Paumier, 176 Wash. 2d
29, 32, 288 P.3d 1126, 1128 (2012).
4. Jeanine Blackett Lutzenhiser, Comment, An Open Courts Checklist: Clarifying Washington’s
Public Trial and Public Access Jurisprudence, 87 WASH. L. REV. 1203 (2012).
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THE U.S. AND WASHINGTON CONSTITUTIONS
GUARANTEE BOTH THE DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO
PUBLIC TRIAL AND THE PUBLIC’S RIGHT TO OPEN
ACCESS

When a Washington State judge excludes members of the public from
court proceedings, or seals records related to a case, the exclusion
implicates state and federal constitutional rights of the public and, in
criminal cases, of the defendants.
The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and article I, section
22 of the Washington Constitution contain nearly identical provisions
guaranteeing the right of an accused to a public trial.5 The First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution is generally understood to
guarantee open access for the public and press to judicial proceedings.6
The freedoms enumerated in the First Amendment—of speech, the
press, the right of assembly, and the right to petition the government—
”share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication
on matters relating to the functioning of government.”7 Article I, section
10 of the Washington Constitution also contains a separate guarantee of
the open administration of justice: “Justice in all cases shall be
administered openly, and without unnecessary delay.”8 This special
emphasis on the presumption of open court proceedings renders the
Washington Constitution at least arguably more stringent on this point,
and the Washington State Supreme Court’s decisions have consistently
emphasized the value of open administration of justice.9
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22 (“In criminal
prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person, or by counsel . . . to
have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county in which the offense is charged to have
been committed and the right to appeal in all cases . . . .”).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.”). For a discussion of the open-access guarantees flowing from the First
Amendment, see Lutzenhiser, supra note 4, at 1207–08.
7. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980).
8. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 10.
9. See, e.g., State v. Wise, 176 Wash. 2d 1, 5, 288 P.3d 1113, 1115 (2012); State v. Lormor, 172
Wash. 2d 85, 90–91, 257 P.3d 624, 627–28 (2011); In re Detention of D.F.F., 172 Wash. 2d 37, 39–
40, 256 P.3d 357, 359–60 (2011); State v. Strode, 167 Wash. 2d 222, 229–30; 217 P.3d 310, 315–16
(2009); State v. Momah, 167 Wash. 2d 140, 147–48, 217 P.3d 321, 324–25 (2009); State v.
Easterling, 157 Wash. 2d 167, 179, 137 P.3d 825, 830–31 (2006); Rufer v. Abbott Labs., 154 Wash.
2d 530, 540, 114 P.3d 1182, 1186–87 (2005); In re Orange, 152 Wash. 2d 795, 804–05, 100 P.3d
291, 295–96 (2005); Dreiling v. Jain, 151 Wash. 2d 900, 903–04, 93 P.3d 861, 864 (2004); State v.
Bone-Club, 128 Wash. 2d 254, 258, 906 P.2d 325, 327 (1995); Allied Daily Newspapers of
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Under both constitutions, “the public’s right of access is not absolute,
and may be limited to protect other interests.”10 In several important
cases involving challenges brought by the media, the Washington State
Supreme Court defined the public’s right to open proceedings under
article I, section 10. In Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa11 and Allied Daily
Newspapers v. Eikenberry,12 the Court announced the test to be used to
balance the public’s right to access against other compelling interests.13
In more recent years, the Court has addressed numerous cases
involving the defendant’s right to a public trial under article I, section
22. Actions challenged as unconstitutional closures (exclusion of the
public) have ranged from the total clearing of the courtroom for all or
part of pretrial proceedings or trial;14 the exclusion of particular
members of the public;15 the private questioning of prospective jurors in
the judge’s chambers;16 and even the bailiff’s release, for reasons of
illness, of two members of the jury venire before voir dire even began.17
Issues at the core of these recent closure cases include the scope of
the defendant’s public trial right (i.e., to what proceedings does the right
attach) and the proper analysis for deciding when closure is justified (i.e.
how to balance the defendant’s right to open trial, the public’s right to
open proceedings, and other compelling interests arguably justifying
closure—which may include the defendant’s right to a fair trial).18 On
Washington v. Eikenberry, 121 Wash. 2d 205, 209–10, 848 P.2d 1258, 1260–61 (1993); Seattle
Times Co. v. Ishikawa, 97 Wash. 2d 30, 36, 640 P.2d 716, 719 (1982); Federated Publ’ns, Inc. v.
Kurtz, 94 Wash. 2d 51, 59–60, 615 P.2d 440, 444–45 (1980).
10. Ishikawa, 97 Wash. 2d at 36, 640 P.2d at 719.
11. 97 Wash. 2d 30, 640 P.2d 716.
12. 121 Wash. 2d 205, 848 P.2d 1258.
13. See Eikenberry, 121 Wash. 2d at 209–11, 848 P.2d at 1260–61; Ishikawa, 97 Wash. 2d at 37–
39, 640 P.2d at 720–21. This test parallels the test for evaluating courtroom closures. See infra Part
II.
14. See, e.g., Easterling, 157 Wash. 2d at 177, 137 P.3d at 830; State v. Brightman, 155 Wash. 2d
506, 509, 122 P.3d 150, 151 (2005); Orange, 152 Wash. 2d at 799, 100 P.3d at 293; Bone-Club, 128
Wash. 2d at 256, 906 P.2d at 326.
15. State v. Lormor, 172 Wash. 2d 85, 257 P.3d 624 (2011).
16. See, e.g., State v. Wise, 176 Wash. 2d 1, 288 P.3d 1113 (2012); State v. Paumier, 176 Wash.
2d 29, 288 P.3d 1126 (2012); State v. Strode, 167 Wash. 2d 222, 217 P.3d 310 (2009); State v.
Momah, 167 Wash. 2d 140, 217 P.3d 321 (2009).
17. State v. Wilson, __ Wash. App. __, 298 P.3d 148, 150–51 (2013).
18. See, e.g., Lormor, 172 Wash. 2d at 90–91, 257 P.3d at 627–28; In re Detention of D.F.F., 172
Wash. 2d 37, 39–40, 256 P.3d 357, 359–60 (2011); Strode, 167 Wash. 2d at 229–30, 217 P.3d at
315–16; Momah, 167 Wash. 2d at 147–48, 217 P.3d at 324–25; Easterling, 157 Wash. 2d at 179,
137 P.3d at 830–31; Rufer v. Abbott Labs., 154 Wash. 2d 530, 540, 114 P.3d 1182, 1186–87
(2005); Orange, 152 Wash. 2d at 804–05, 100 P.3d at 295–96; Dreiling v. Jain, 151 Wash. 2d 900,
903–04, 93 P.3d 861, 864 (2004); Bone-Club, 128 Wash. 2d at 258, 906 P.2d at 327; Eikenberry,
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these issues, the justices are deeply divided. The Court is also struggling
to reach consensus on the test for appellate review, whether and when an
error is structural, and what remedy should apply.
II.

IN STATE V. BONE-CLUB, THE WASHINGTON STATE
SUPREME COURT DEVISED ITS OWN TEST TO EVALUATE
A PROPOSED COURTROOM CLOSURE

The seminal Washington case governing issues of public trial under
section 22 is State v. Bone-Club,19 which involved closure of a pretrial
hearing to protect the identity of a witness who was an undercover
detective. In Bone-Club the Washington State Supreme Court returned to
the test used under article I, section 10 to protect the public’s right to
access (first set out in Ishikawa and reiterated in Eikenberry), and
adopted it for purposes of protecting a defendant’s right to a public trial
under article I, section 22. The test has five parts, briefly summarized
below:
1. The proponent of closure must identify the interests or rights
justifying closure and make some showing of the need therefore; if
the closure is not sought to protect the defendant’s right to a fair
trial, the proponent must show a serious and imminent threat to an
important interest.
2. Those present must be given an opportunity to object.
3. The closure must be the least restrictive means available and
effective to protect the interest.
4. The court must weigh the competing interests, consider alternative
methods, and should articulate specific findings and conclusions.
5. The order must be no broader in its application or duration than
necessary to serve its purpose.20
The Court also held that the trial judge has the responsibility to
protect a defendant’s right to a public trial.21 Because the judge had not
engaged in this “weighing of the competing interests”22 before closing
the hearing, the Court was unable to determine whether closure was
warranted: “We hold the trial court’s failure to follow the five-step

121 Wash. 2d at 209–10, 848 P.2d at 1260–61; Ishikawa, 97 Wash. 2d at 36, 640 P.2d at 719;
Federated Publ’ns, Inc. v. Kurtz, 94 Wash. 2d 51, 59–60, 615 P.2d 440, 444–45 (1980).
19. 128 Wash. 2d 254, 906 P.2d 325.
20. Id. at 258–59, 906 P.2d at 327–28; see also Ishikawa, 97 Wash. 2d at 37–39, 640 P.2d at 720–
21.
21. Bone-Club, 128 Wash. 2d at 256, 906 P.2d at 326.
22. Id. at 256, 906 P.3d at 326.
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closure test enunciated in this court’s section 10 cases violated
Defendant’s right to a public trial under section 22.”23 The Court
reversed and remanded for a new trial.24
It soon became apparent that trial judges did not consider certain
routine procedures (which ordinarily had no “proponent”) to be closures
and so did not engage in the Bone-Club analysis before (most
commonly) protecting privacy of prospective jurors and encouraging
candor in their responses by using sealed questionnaires and conducting
parts of voir dire in a closed courtroom or in chambers.25 About ten
years after Bone-Club, the Court began addressing a series of such cases
involving article I, section 22, and has vacated dozens of convictions in
cases where the Bone-Club analysis was not applied.26 (As a result, the
issue has become so familiar that in courthouses in Washington, “BoneClub” is now a verb.)
In the wake of these reversals, Washington judges and practitioners
have been asking practical questions, the most urgent of which are: to
what proceedings does the public trial right attach? And what exactly is
a closure?
Certain basic things are clear. “[N]ot every interaction between the
court, counsel, and defendants will implicate the right to a public trial, or
constitute a closure if closed to the public.”27 But the public trial right is
implicated (and thus Bone-Club analysis is required) when a proceeding
23. Id. at 261, 906 P.3d at 329.
24. Id.
25. This may be a result of language in the cases. In Ishikawa, prefacing the announcement of the
test, the Court stated: “Each time restrictions on access to criminal hearings or the records from
hearings are sought, courts must follow these steps . . . .” Ishikawa, 97 Wash. 2d at 37, 640 P.2d at
720. In Bone-Club, the Court held that the trial judge has a responsibility to protect Defendant’s
public trial right, and, citing Ishikawa, that “[t]he motion to close, not Defendant’s objection,
triggered the trial court’s duty to perform the weighing procedure.” Bone-Club, 128 Wash. 2d at
261, 906 P.2d at 329. Given that the test itself contemplates a proponent and opponent, trial judges
may have believed that routine procedures not “sought” by any party were not the sort of procedures
to which Bone-Club applied. See Ishikawa, 97 Wash. 2d at 39, 640 P.2d at 721.
26. See, e.g., In re Morris, 176 Wash. 2d 157, 288 P.3d 1140 (2012); State v. Wise, 176 Wash. 2d
1, 288 P.3d 1113 (2012); State v. Strode, 167 Wash. 2d 222, 217 P.3d 310 (2009); State v.
Easterling, 157 Wash. 2d 167, 137 P.3d 825 (2006); State v. Brightman, 155 Wash. 2d 506, 122
P.3d 150 (2005); In re Orange, 152 Wash. 2d 795, 100 P.3d 291 (2005); State v. Hummel, 165
Wash. App. 749, 266 P.3d 269 (2012); State v. Njonge, 161 Wash. App. 568, 255 P.3d 753 (2011);
State v. Tinh Trinh Lam, 161 Wash. App. 299, 254 P.3d 891 (2011); State v. Leyerle, 158 Wash.
App. 474, 242 P.3d 921 (2010); State v. Bowen, 157 Wash. App. 821, 239 P.3d 1114 (2010); State
v. Waldon, 148 Wash. App. 952, 202 P.3d 325 (2009); State v. Sadler, 147 Wash. App. 97, 193
P.3d 1108 (2008); State v. Erickson, 146 Wash. App. 200, 189 P.3d 245 (2008); State v. Duckett,
141 Wash. App. 797, 173 P.3d 948 (2007); State v. Frawley, 140 Wash. App. 713, 167 P.3d 593
(2007). For a discussion of some of these cases, see Lutzenhiser, supra note 4, at 1225–35.
27. State v. Sublett, 176 Wash. 2d 58, 71, 292 P.3d 715, 721 (2012).
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normally conducted in open court, including jury voir dire, is purposely
closed to the public.28
Not yet clear are many of the larger questions, such as the proper test
for determining exactly which proceedings implicate the defendant’s
public trial right;29 whether the failure of a trial court to undertake a
Bone-Club analysis is itself a constitutional error, regardless of whether
the closure was justified;30 whether a public trial error (either unjustified
closure or failure to conduct the Bone-Club analysis) is always structural
error and not subject to harmless error analysis (and therefore always
requires a new trial);31 whether the Washington appellate rule for review
of constitutional errors raised for the first time on appeal applies in these
cases;32 and whether, in the absence of a Bone-Club analysis, a
reviewing court will examine the record to determine the
constitutionality of a closure.33
III. THE FOUR RECENT DECISIONS REVEAL A DEEPENING
DIVIDE
The four decisions announced November 21, 2012 involved two types
of closure: the private questioning of jurors, and an in-chambers
conference to consider a question from a deliberating jury. The Court
reached a narrow majority in two cases but only a plurality in the other
two, and the opinions are notable for sharp disagreements on key issues.
We begin with State v. Sublett34 (the only case in which the Court
affirmed), because it announced a new test and because Chief Justice
Madsen’s concurrence is a wide-ranging discussion that supplements her
dissents in the other cases.
A.

State v. Sublett: A Chambers Conference to Discuss a Question
from the Deliberating Jury Does Not Implicate the Right to Public
Trial
In Sublett,35 the issue was the consideration, in chambers, of a

28. Wise, 176 Wash. 2d at 11–13, 288 P.3d at 1118–19.
29. See infra Part III.A.
30. See infra Part III.B.
31. Id.
32. See infra Parts III.B and C.
33. See infra Parts III.A, B, and C.
34. 176 Wash. 2d 58, 292 P.3d 715 (plurality opinion).
35. The plurality opinion by Justice C. Johnson, was joined by Justices Chambers, Owens, and J.
Johnson. Justice Stephens was joined in her concurrence by Justice Fairhurst, and Justice Pro
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question from the jury about the court’s instructions. The justices
unanimously agreed to affirm Sublett’s conviction. But the lead opinion
garnered only a plurality, and the three separate concurrences
demonstrate the disparate analytic paths the justices take, and the many
areas in which consensus remains elusive.
1.

A Plurality Inaugurates a New Test

During its deliberations in Michael Sublett’s trial for murder, the jury
submitted a question regarding the court’s accomplice liability
instruction.36 The court and counsel met in chambers and discussed the
question. No one objected to the procedure. Counsel agreed with the
court’s proposed answer, which was simply to tell the jury to reread the
instructions.37 That answer was duly given and placed in the record,
although no record was made of the chambers conference.38 The jury
convicted Sublett on alternative charges of premeditated first-degree
murder and felony murder, and the court sentenced him to life without
the possibility of parole.39
On direct appeal, Sublett argued that the discussion of the jury’s
question in chambers violated his right to public trial. The Washington
State Court of Appeals disagreed and affirmed, holding that the public
trial right does not extend to proceedings involving “purely ministerial
or legal issues that do not require the resolution of disputed facts,”40 and
that because the jury’s question involved a “purely legal” issue,
consideration in chambers did not implicate the right.41
The Washington State Supreme Court also affirmed, but on different
reasoning. Writing for a plurality, Justice Charles Johnson reiterated that
despite the strong presumption that courts are to be open at all stages of
trial, the public trial right is not absolute, and may be overcome to serve
“an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential and
narrowly tailored to preserve higher values.”42 The Court observed that
“not every interaction between the court, counsel, and defendants will

Tempore Alexander. Justice Wiggins concurred in result only. Chief Justice Madsen wrote a
separate concurrence.
36. Sublett, 176 Wash. 2d at 67, 292 P.3d at 719.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 67–68, 292 P.3d at 719.
41. Id. at 68, 292 P.3d at 719.
42. Id. at 71, 292 P.3d at 721 (citing Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 45 (1984)).
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implicate the right to a public trial, or constitute a closure if closed to the
public.”43
But the Court rejected the legal/factual distinction made by the Court
of Appeals,44 reasoning that although the distinction “somewhat
parallels” its desired approach, it was inadequate to protect a defendant’s
public trial right because “[t]he resolution of legal issues is quite often
accomplished during an adversarial proceeding, and disputed facts are
sometimes resolved by stipulation following informal conferencing
between counsel.”45 In her concurrence, Justice Stephens explicitly
rejected the legal/factual distinction, otherwise agreeing with the
plurality on all issues.46 A majority of the Court thus found the
legal/factual distinction at least inadequate, standing alone, to protect
defendants’ and the public’s right to an open trial.
Instead, the Court adopted the “experience and logic test,” which
originated in a 1986 U.S. Supreme Court case, Press-Enterprise Co. v.
Superior Court (Press II).47 The Sublett Court found this test desirable
because it allows the trial court “to consider the actual proceeding at
issue for what it is, without having to force every situation into
predefined factors.”48
The experience and logic test has two parts. The experience prong
determines “whether the place and process have historically been open
to the press and general public.”49 The logic prong determines “whether
public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the
particular process in question.”50 If the answer to both questions is yes,
the right to public trial is implicated, and the court must analyze the
proposed closure using the Bone-Club factors.51
Applying the test to the facts in Sublett, the Court held the right to a
public trial did not attach to the chambers conference. Considering the
experience prong, the Court analogized consideration of the jury’s

43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 72, 292 P.3d at 722.
46. Id. at 136, 292 P.3d at 753 (Stephens, J., concurring).
47. 478 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1986) (holding that a qualified First Amendment right of access attaches
to preliminary hearings and that such a proceeding can therefore not be closed unless specific, on
the record findings are made demonstrating that “closure is essential to preserve higher values and is
narrowly tailored to serve that interest”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
48. Sublett, 176 Wash. 2d at 73, 292 P.3d at 722.
49. Press II, 478 U.S. at 8.
50. Id.
51. Sublett, 176 Wash. 2d at 73, 292 P.3d at 722.
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question to a jury instruction conference, an informal proceeding often
held in places other than an open courtroom, and concluded that the
place and process have in fact not historically been open to the press and
public. The Court also emphasized that the procedure for handling
questions from a jury is controlled by a court rule, CrR6.15(f), which
requires that jury questions be submitted in writing.52 The trial judge has
discretion to manage a jury question in open court, but CrR 6.15(f)(1)
does not require it.53 Considering that the rule is apparently the only
authority governing the process of handling questions from a
deliberating jury, the Court concluded that consideration of a
deliberating jury’s question has historically not been open to the press
and public. Regarding the “logic prong,” the Court decided that “none of
the values served by the public trial right is violated under the facts of
this case.”54 Rights attaching to the trial itself—the right to appear, to
cross-examine witnesses, to introduce or exclude evidence—do not
attach to the process governing the court’s handling of a question from
the deliberating jury where the question concerns the court’s
instructions.55 Thus there was no violation of Sublett’s right to a public
trial.
In her concurrence, Justice Stephens approved both the result and the
adoption of the experience and logic test.56 She wrote separately because
the plurality had not completely rejected the distinction between “purely
ministerial or legal” proceedings and those that “require the resolution of
disputed facts.”57 She contended the distinction is faulty, misleading, and
premised on labels rather than substance.58 Justice Stephens also wrote
separately to express sharp disagreement with the arguments of Chief
Justice Madsen and Justice Wiggins, whose concurrences advocated
application of Rule of Appellate Procedure (RAP) 2.5(a)(3) to determine
whether a court will grant review. Justice Stephens took the position that
such a requirement incorrectly equates failure to object with voluntary
waiver: “We have repeatedly and conclusively rejected a
52. Id. at 76, 292 P.3d at 724. The rule next requires that “the court’s response and any objections
thereto shall be made a part of the record,” and finally that “[t]he court shall respond . . . in open
court or in writing . . . [a]ny additional instruction upon any point of law shall be given in writing.”
Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 77, 292 P.3d at 724.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 136, 292 P.3d at 753 (Stephens, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 136, 292 P.3d at 753 (quoting State v. Sublett, 156 Wash. App. 160, 181, 231 P.3d 231,
242 (2010)).
58. See id. at 136–42, 292 P.3d at 753–756.
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contemporaneous objection rule in the context of the public trial right.”59
2.

Concurring Chief Justice Madsen and Justice Wiggins Agree with
Plurality’s Result, but Take Issue With Its Analysis

In his concurrence, Justice Wiggins argued that the federal experience
and logic test actually conflicts with article I, section 10 of the
Washington Constitution,60 because “[u]nder article I, section 10, every
part of the administration of justice is presumptively open”61:
[T]he United States Supreme Court is much freer to limit
courtroom openness than we are. With this in mind, I would
reject the experience and logic test because it is contrary to the
plain language of article I, section 10. We cannot say, on the one
hand, that justice must be administered openly, but that on the
other hand certain stages of a proceeding can be closed to the
public because experience and logic tell us they can be closed.
This is a contradiction. Either our courts are open, or they are
not.62
Justice Wiggins also described the test as similar to the “so-called
‘triviality’ or ‘de minimis’ approach, which is used in the federal courts
but that we have declined to adopt.”63 Justice Wiggins would distinguish
the right to open trial from the remedy—the right to open administration
of justice from “entitlement to a certain form of relief (namely, a new
trial).”64 He argued that for purposes of appellate review, closure cases
are no different from other constitutional error cases and should be
governed by the usual rule, which is RAP 2.5.65 Under the rule, an
appellant who did not object to an alleged error at trial may obtain
review only by showing “manifest constitutional error”—that is,
constitutional error that prejudices the outcome, error that has “practical
and identifiable consequences in the trial of the case.”66 Justice Wiggins

59. Id. at 143, 292 P.3d at 756–57 (citations omitted).
60. Id. at 145, 292 P.3d at 759 (Wiggins, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 147, 292 P.3d at 759.
62. Id. at 148–9, 292 P.3d at 759 (citations omitted). Justice Wiggins pointed to the problems
identifying “experience” under the test, noting that research will be difficult and questioning the
relevance of experience after adoption of the State Constitution in 1889. He concluded that “[i]t is
simpler and more true to our constitution merely to say that all phases of judicial proceedings are
presumptively open.” Id. at 147, 292 P.3d at 760.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 151, 292 P.3d at 761.
65. Id.
66. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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rejected Justice Stephens’ argument that applying the rule amounts to
treating silence as a waiver of the right, pointing out that the rule is by
definition a rule for review of constitutional error not objected to
below,67 and review will be undertaken if prejudice occurred.68 He
declined to rely upon State v. Marsh,69 the Washington case cited by his
colleagues for the proposition that failure to object does not constitute a
waiver, because it preceded the Rules of Appellate Procedure by fifty
years: “Marsh [does not] justify disregarding our rules of appellate
procedure.”70
In concurrence, Chief Justice Madsen voiced general arguments
regarding the Court’s jurisprudence in this area. She expressly intended
her concurrence, together with her dissents in the three other cases
decided the same day (State v. Wise,71 State v. Paumier,72 and In re
Morris,73 discussed below) to constitute “a single opinion touching on
the multiple aspects of the public trial right and appellate review as they
are presented by all four cases.”74 Her objective was to explain “why I
believe the court’s approach to reviewing public trial issues is
exceptionally and unnecessarily strict.”75
As to the scope of the right to public trial, Chief Justice Madsen
believes both the ministerial/factual analysis and the logic and
experience test are useful tools for determining when the right attaches.76
She observed that under both tests, history matters; if the history of the
type of proceeding subject to closure provides no answer, the court must
examine the values protected by the right and whether those values are
served by requiring a particular part of the proceedings to be open.77 The
values are those identified in the U.S. Supreme Court case Waller v.
67. Id. at 154, 292 P.3d at 762.
68. Id. at 153, 292 P.2d at 762.
69. 126 Wash. 142, 217 P. 705 (1923).
70. Sublett, 176 Wash. 2d at 153, 292 P.3d at 761 (Wiggins, J., concurring).
71. 176 Wash. 2d 1, 288 P.3d 1113 (2012).
72. 176 Wash. 2d 29, 288 P.3d 1126 (2012).
73. 176 Wash. 2d 157, 288 P.3d 1140 (2012).
74. Sublett, 176 Wash. 2d at 90, 292 P.3d at 731 (Madsen, C.J., concurring).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 99, 292 P.3d at 735. But she pointed out that the experience and logic test has been used
to determine the scope of the right to open access under the First Amendment; she found no case
applying the test to determine the scope of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right, id. at 94, 292 P.3d
at 733, and she noted the reminder from the United States Supreme Court in Presley v. Georgia that
“the extent to which the First and Sixth amendment public trial rights are coextensive is an open
question.” Id. at 95, 292 P.3d at 733 (quoting Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209 (2010)).
77. Id. at 98–99, 292 P.3d at 735.
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Georgia78: ensuring a fair trial, reminding participants of their functions
and their obligation to the accused, and encouraging witnesses to come
forward and testify truthfully.79 If the values are served by openness,
then the right attaches and a Bone-Club inquiry is required. If those
values are not served, “there is no constitutionally imperative reason for
attaching the public trial right to the particular part of the proceedings.”80
Chief Justice Madsen’s principal concern is the Court’s practice of
ordering a new trial in “virtually every case where a closure occurred
without” a Bone-Club analysis.81 “It is a mystery why, if the trial court
does not engage in an on-the-record Bone-Club inquiry . . . this court
believes it must foreclose all other possible ways in which the inquiry
could be conducted.”82 She agreed with Justice Wiggins that review
should be governed by the usual rule for constitutional error not raised
below, RAP 2.5(a)(3), which requires a showing of prejudice resulting
from the closure.83 She criticized the plurality’s reliance on Waller,
pointing out that there, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that closure
of the suppression hearing may have been partly justified, and ordered
the trial court on remand to consider what portions, if any, of a new
hearing could be closed.84 She termed it a “poor result” that the majority
has adopted a rule requiring a new trial without a showing of prejudice.85
She also contended that the reviewing court should conduct its own
examination of the record to determine whether error occurred, and if the
record proves inadequate to the purpose, should consider remand for
development of the record rather than automatically ordering a new trial.
She pointed out that in State v. Momah,86 the Court determined from the
record that no violation occurred.87

78. 467 U.S. 39 (1984).
79. Sublett, 176 Wash. 2d at 99, 292 P.3d at 735 (Madsen, C.J., concurring) (citing Waller, 467
U.S. at 46–47).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 90, 292 P.3d at 731.
82. Id. at 105, 292 P.3d at 738.
83. See id. at 123–28, 292 P.3d at 747–49.
84. Id. at 116–17, 292 P.3d at 743–44.
85. Id. at 115, 292 P.3d at 743.
86. 167 Wash. 2d 140, 217 P.3d 321 (2009).
87. Sublett, 176 Wash. 2d at 119–20, 292 P.3d at 745 (Madsen, C.J., concurring).
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State v. Paumier and State v. Wise: Failure to Conduct a BoneClub Inquiry Is a Violation of the Right to Public Trial and Is Itself
“Structural Error”

In Paumier and Wise,88 a narrow majority of the Court agreed that the
failure to conduct a Bone-Club inquiry before ordering a closure is not
only error that violates the right to public trial, but also is “structural
error,” which requires automatic reversal and remand for a new trial.
Vigorous dissents rejected this “rigid” rule in favor of application of the
Rules of Appellate Procedure and a post trial inquiry that could satisfy
the requirements of Bone-Club without the time and expense of a new
trial.
1.

The Wise and Paumier Majorities Hold the Absence of the BoneClub Test Constitutes “Structural Error”

Wise and Paumier both involved private questioning of prospective
jurors during voir dire.89 In both cases, the Court held to its earlier
view90 that such private questioning, undertaken without weighing the
competing constitutional interests through a Bone-Club inquiry,
constituted a closure that violated the defendant’s right to public trial.91
In Wise, the Court drew a series of bright lines. First, the Court
reiterated that private questioning of prospective jurors in chambers is a
closure requiring consideration of the Bone-Club criteria.92 Second,
closure without such consideration violates the defendant’s right to
public trial.93 Third, violation of the right to public trial is “structural
error.”94 And fourth, the Court went further, expressly holding that the
failure to conduct a Bone-Club analysis is itself structural error which is

88. In both cases, Justice Owens was joined by Justices Chambers, Fairhurst, and Stephens, and
Justice Pro Tem Alexander and Chief Justice Madsen wrote a dissenting opinion. In Paumier,
Justice Wiggins dissented, joined by Justices C. Johnson and J. Johnson; in Wise, Justice J. Johnson
dissented, joined by Justices C. Johnson and Wiggins.
89. In Wise, the subjects discussed during the private questioning included personal health
matters, relationships with witnesses or law enforcement, and criminal history. State v. Wise, 176
Wash. 2d 1, 7, 288 P.3d 1113, 1116 (2012). In-chambers discussion in Paumier included personal
health issues, criminal history, and familiarity with the defendant or the crime. State v. Paumier, 176
Wash. 2d 29, 33, 288 P.3d 1126, 1128 (2012).
90. State v. Strode, 167 Wash. 2d 222, 223, 217 P.3d 310, 312 (2009).
91. Wise, 176 Wash. 2d at 6, 288 P.3d at 1115; Paumier, 176 Wash. 2d at 32, 288 P.3d at 1128.
92. Wise, 176 Wash. 2d at 11, 288 P.3d at 1118.
93. Id. at 13, 288 P.3d at 1119.
94. Id. at 13–14, 288 P.3d at 1119.
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per se prejudicial and automatically requires a new trial.95 The Court
further held that failure to object at trial does not constitute a waiver of
the right to public trial that would preclude raising the issue on appeal,
because such a waiver requires an affirmative indication of the
defendant’s understanding of the right.96
Structural error is a special category of constitutional error that, even
where it does not appear to prejudice a particular defendant, “affect[s]
the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than [being]
simply an error in the trial process itself.”97 Where such error occurs, “a
criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for
determination of guilt or innocence, and no criminal punishment may be
regarded as fundamentally fair.”98 Structural error is presumed
prejudicial and is not subject to harmless error review.99
In both Wise and Paumier, the dissent argued that the defendants
actually benefited from the closures because prospective jurors may have
been more candid about hardships and biases in private questioning.100
In each case, however, the majority was unmoved by the apparent
absence of prejudice, emphasizing that by its nature, a structural error
has the potential to weaken the foundations of justice: “It is the
framework of our system of justice that we must protect against erosion
of the public trial right.”101
Regarding remedy, the Wise Court noted that remand for a new public
proceeding might be appropriate where the violation occurred in the
context of an “easily separable” proceeding such as a suppression
hearing.102 But the Court concluded it could not “reasonably order a
‘redo’ of voir dire to remedy the public trial violation that occurred
here.”103 The Court vacated Wise’s conviction and remanded for a new

95. Wise, 176 Wash. 2d at 6, 288 P.3d at 1115. The Court also held this in Paumier, 176 Wash.
2d at 37, 288 P.3d at 1130.
96. Wise, 176 Wash. 2d at 15, 288 P.3d at 1120; see also State v. Strode, 167 Wash. 2d 222, 229
n.3, 217 P.3d 310, 315 n.3 (2009) (explaining that the right to public trial is protected in the same
constitutional provision as the right to trial by jury, and so can likewise be waived only in a
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent manner).
97. Wise, 176 Wash. 2d at 13–14, 288 P.3d at 1119 (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S.
279, 310 (1991)).
98. Id. at 14, 288 P.3d at 1119 (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310).
99. Id.
100. Wise, 176 Wash. 2d at 25, 288 P.3d at 1125 (J. Johnson, J., dissenting); Paumier, 176 Wash.
2d at 52, 288 P.3d at 1137 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
101. Wise, 176 Wash. 2d at 18, 288 P.3d at 1121.
102. Id. at 19, 288 P.3d at 1122.
103. Id.
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trial “that is open to the public, except as the trial court may direct a
closure upon full scrutiny and consideration of the public trial right
under Bone-Club.”104 The holding in Paumier was nearly identical.105
2.

Dissenters Decry “Rigid Rules” and Reject Automatic Application
of the Structural Error Doctrine

Chief Justice Madsen dissented in Wise and Paumier. Justice James
Johnson also dissented in Wise and was joined by Justices Wiggins and
Charles Johnson. In Paumier, Justice Wiggins authored a dissent joined
by Justices Charles Johnson and James Johnson.
Chief Justice Madsen’s dissent reiterated her rejection of the
proposition that mere failure to engage in a Bone-Club inquiry is itself
structural error.106 She contended the transformation of the Bone-Club
inquiry into an independent, substantive constitutional right is
unwarranted and has far-reaching consequences.107 In Sublett, she had
argued that “the failure to engage in the inquiry should not turn a
justifiable closure into a violation of the right to a public trial.”108 She
noted again in Wise that the closure may well have been constitutionally
justified,109 and accused the majority of adopting a “rigid doctrine”110
with “inflexible rules”111 which result in a “costly and unnecessary
response that is not constitutionally required.”112
Instead, Chief Justice Madsen argued that the reviewing court should
examine the record to determine whether or not the closures at trial were
justified.113 She observed that courts in other jurisdictions regularly
engage in posttrial inquiries to determine whether a closure was
justified,114 and that the United States Supreme Court itself did exactly
104. Id.
105. Paumier, 176 Wash. 2d at 37, 288 P.3d at 1130.
106. Id. at 39, 288 P.3d at 1131 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 39–40, 288 P.3d at 1131–32; Wise, 176 Wash. 2d at 22, 288 P.3d at 1123 (Madsen,
C.J., dissenting).
108. State v. Sublett, 176 Wash. 2d 58, 103, 292 P.3d 715, 737 (2012) (Madsen, C.J.,
concurring).
109. Wise, 176 Wash. 2d at 23, 288 P.2d at 1124 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 20, 288 P.3d at 1123.
111. Paumier, 176 Wash. 2d at 38, 288 P.3d 1131 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting).
112. Wise, 176 Wash. 2d at 21, 288 P.3d at 1123 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting).
113. Paumier, 176 Wash. 2d at 40, 288 P.3d at 1132 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting).
114. State v. Sublett, 176 Wash. 2d 58, 105–06, 292 P.3d 715, 738 (2012) (Madsen, C.J.,
concurring) (discussing Kendrick v. State and People v. Kline among other cases). In Kendrick v.
State, 670 N.E.2d 369 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), the trial court had failed to enter specific findings
concerning its order excluding certain persons from the courtroom during the testimony of a
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that in Waller.115 She reminded her colleagues that in Momah, the
Washington State Supreme Court itself examined the record on review
and determined that closure of voir dire did not violate the right to public
trial and therefore did not constitute structural error.116 She argued that
the decisions in Wise and Paumier have “ignored Momah,”117
“distinguished [Momah] out of existence,”118 and even “turn[ed]
precedent into pretense.”119
Under Chief Justice Madsen’s approach, if the record does not
indicate whether the closure was justified, remand would be appropriate
to clarify the reasons for closure under the Bone-Club factors.120 If the
review shows the closure was justified and did not violate the
defendant’s public trial right, “then the matter is at an end.”121 If the
inquiry reveals an unjustified, unconstitutional closure, “then, and only
then, would it be necessary to decide whether the violation was
structural error requiring reversal and a new trial.”122
If it turns out that an unconstitutional closure did occur, Chief Justice
Madsen and Justices James Johnson, Charles Johnson, and Wiggins all
agree that Rule of Appellate Procedure 2.5(a)(3) should govern review.
The Paumier majority’s discussion of RAP 2.5(a)(3) and its statement
that the rule “does not apply in its typical manner here”123 generated a
strong response from Chief Justice Madsen in her Sublett concurrence;
she charged the Court with sweeping aside “the entire scheme of

confidential informant in a felony drug dealing case. Id. at 370. The Indiana Court of Appeals
initially remanded the case to the trial court in order to obtain those findings. Id. The Court of
Appeals then applied the Waller test to those findings, and determined that the court had identified
an overriding interest—the protection of a confidential informant—and that the closure (exclusion
of two friends of the defendant, who had a history of violence) was “narrowly tailored to protect the
witness with as little impact as possible on the defendant’s right to a public trial.” Id. at 371.
In People v. Kline, 494 N.W.2d 756 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992), the trial court failed to make findings
on the record to support closure during the testimony of a young rape victim. Id. at 760. The
Michigan Court of Appeals emphasized the importance (articulated in Waller and Press-Enterprise
I) of specific findings in order to determine if a closure order was proper. Id. at 760–61. The court in
Kline remanded to the trial court “with directions to supplement the record with the facts and
reasoning” that supported its decision to clear the courtroom. Id.
115. Paumier, 176 Wash. 2d at 41, 288 P.3d at 1132 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 42, 288 P.3d at 1133.
117. Wise, 176 Wash. 2d at 24, 288 P.3d at 1124 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting).
118. Paumier, 176 Wash. 2d at 40, 288 P.3d at 1131 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting).
119. Wise, 176 Wash. 2d at 24, 288 P.3d at 1124 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting).
120. Paumier, 176 Wash. 2d at 41, 288 P.3d at 1132 (Madsen, J., dissenting).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 42, 288 P.3d at 1132.
123. Id. at 36, 288 P.3d at 1130 (majority opinion).
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appellate review under the rules . . . . With this breathtaking, and
incorrect, conclusion, the majority completely dispenses with the rules
for addressing constitutional error on review.”124
Applying the rule to the facts of Wise, Justice James Johnson argued
that “there is no indication that the individual questioning of potential
jurors prejudiced Wise. If anything, Wise benefited from the information
obtained from the potential jurors’ candid responses.”125 He concluded:
“the alleged error was not “manifest” and Wise cannot raise it for the
first time on appeal.”126 Justice Wiggins reached the same conclusion in
Paumier.127
Justice James Johnson in Wise and Justice Wiggins in Paumier both
highlighted Momah, in which, as Justice Wiggins notes, the Court held
that “not every public trial violation is structural error.”128 Justice
Wiggins pointed out that Momah “is consistent with United States
Supreme Court precedent.”129 Both Justices concluded that Washington
precedent does not require the conclusion that a violation of the right to
public trial is necessarily structural.130 Justice Wiggins argued that the
improper voir dire closure in Paumier, while a violation of the public
trial right, did not constitute structural error because it:
[D]id not render the trial unfair, nor did it convert an otherwise
sound trial into an unreliable vehicle for determination of guilt
or innocence. An error like this fails to meet the high standard
for structural error . . . . If anything, in-chambers voir dire
protects the defendant’s right to a fair and unbiased trial.131

124. State v. Sublett, 176 Wash. 2d 58, 127, 288 P.3d 715, 749 (2012) (Madsen, C.J.,
concurring).
125. State v. Wise, 176 Wash. 2d 1, 25, 288 P.3d 1113, 1125 (J. Johnson, J., dissenting).
126. Id.
127. Paumier, 176 Wash. 2d at 54–56, 288 P.3d at 1139–40 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 47, 288 P.3d at 1135 (emphasis in original) (citing State v. Momah, 167 Wash. 2d 140,
150–51, 217 P.3d 321, 326–27 (2009)).
129. Id.
130. Wise, 176 Wash. 2d at 26, 288 P.3d at 1125 (J. Johnson, J., dissenting) (“Our precedent does
not command this result.”); Paumier, 176 Wash. 2d at 49, 288 P.3d at 1136 (Wiggins, J., dissenting)
(“[W]e have never held that partial in-chambers voir dire without a Bone-Club analysis is structural
error.”).
131. Paumier, 176 Wash. 2d at 50–51, 288 P.3d at 1136 (Wiggins, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original).
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In re Morris: Public Trial Violation Claims Raised on Collateral
Review Decided on Grounds of Ineffective Assistance of Appellate
Counsel

Collateral review is handled in Washington by way of a Personal
Restraint Petition (PRP).132 In In re Morris,133 the Court analogized to In
re Orange.134 In that earlier case, the Washington State Supreme Court
granted Orange’s PRP and remanded for a new trial, holding that his
attorney’s failure to raise a public trail issue on direct review constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel. In In re Morris, a plurality followed
Orange, holding that Morris’ appellate counsel was similarly ineffective.
The two dissenters emphasized factual differences in Orange, and
procedural distinctions between direct appeal and collateral review.
1.

Plurality Holds that Morris, like Orange, Established Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel

On direct appeal, Patrick Morris challenged certain evidentiary
rulings but did not claim any violation of his right to public trial.135 His
convictions were affirmed and the Washington State Supreme Court
denied further review in 2007.136 In 2008, Morris sought collateral relief
in a PRP, contending the trial court violated his public trial right by
privately questioning potential jurors in chambers, and his appellate
counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue in his appeal.137
Morris filed his appeal shortly after the Court decided Orange.
Christopher Orange alleged for the first time in a PRP that an
unconstitutional closure occurred when the trial court, citing space
limitations, excluded all spectators from the courtroom during the whole
of voir dire and refused to make exceptions for Orange’s family or that
of the victim.138 Orange alleged in his PRP that his counsel on direct
appeal was ineffective for failing to raise that issue. The Washington
State Supreme Court agreed, holding that the exclusion was a closure
132. See generally WASH. R. APP. P. 16.3–16.15.
133. 176 Wash. 2d 157, 288 P.3d 1140 (2012). Writing for a plurality, Justice Owens was joined
by Justices Fairhurst and Stephens and Justice Pro Tempore Alexander. Justice Chambers wrote a
separate concurrence, and Chief Justice Madsen, wrote a separate dissent. Justice Wiggins also
dissented, joined by Justices C. Johnson and J. Johnson.
134. 152 Wash. 2d 795, 100 P.3d 291 (2005).
135. Morris, 176 Wash. 2d at 164, 288 P.3d at 1143.
136. Id. at 164, 288 P.3d at 1144.
137. Id. at 164–65, 288 P.3d at 1144.
138. Orange, 152 Wash. 2d at 802–03, 100 P.3d at 294–95.
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and was per se prejudicial, that appellate counsel was ineffective for
failing to raise the issue,139 and that the proper remedy was remand for a
new trial.140
The plurality in Morris applied the same analysis, concluding that
Orange “clarified, without qualification, both that Bone-Club applied to
jury selection and that closure of voir dire to the public without the
requisite analysis was a presumptively prejudicial error on direct
appeal.”141 Morris’ appellate counsel had therefore been ineffective for
failing to raise the issue, and “[n]o clearer prejudice could be
established.”142 As in Orange, the plurality in Morris remanded for a
new trial.143
2.

Dissenters Distinguish Orange, Dispute Ineffective Assistance
Holding, and Emphasize the Distinction Between Direct and
Collateral Review

In separate dissents, Chief Justice Madsen and Justice Wiggins144
argued strenuously that Orange is factually distinguishable and should
not control the result in Morris.145 Justice Wiggins noted that the public
trial violation in Orange was “conspicuous in the record”146 with an
objection made by counsel at trial, whereas Morris and his attorney
made no objection and by their conduct expressed approval of the inchambers questioning of prospective jurors.147 Chief Justice Madsen
argued that Morris’ appellate counsel could reasonably have concluded
from the trial record that “the closure was justified by juror privacy plus
the defendant’s interest in a fair trial decided by unbiased jurors. Closure
for the purpose of obtaining full answers to sensitive questioning served
both of these purposes.”148 Justice Wiggins also argued that, while
hindsight might make the issue an obvious argument on appeal, it was
common practice in courts in Washington and other jurisdictions to
conduct limited in-chambers voir dire, and Morris’s appellate counsel
139. Id. at 800, 100 P.3d at 293.
140. Id.
141. Morris, 176 Wash. 2d at 167, 288 P.3d at 1145.
142. Id. at 166, 288 P.3d at 1144.
143. Id. at 168, 288 P.3d at 1145.
144. Justice Wiggins was joined by Justices Charles Johnson and James Johnson.
145. Morris, 176 Wash. 2d at 177–79, 288 P.3d at 1149–50 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting); id. at
184–85, 288 P.3d at 1153–54 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 185, 288 P.3d at 1153 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 185, 288 P.3d at 1153–54.
148. Id. at 177, 288 P.3d at 1150 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).

10 - Ellington & Lutzenhiser Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

6/17/2013 1:57 PM

512

[Vol. 88:491

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

was hardly “constitutionally deficient for failing to raise and develop
what may have been a novel legal argument at the time.”149 Both Justices
argued that in contrast to Orange, no deficient performance was
apparent on the appellate record in Morris.150
Justice Wiggins also underscored the differences between direct
appeal and collateral review: “Our PRP procedures reflect a crucial and
enduring belief in the importance of finality, [and] [i]t is for this very
reason that we require personal restraint petitioners to demonstrate
prejudice as a prerequisite to relief.”151 Morris demonstrated no
prejudice, and prejudice should not be presumed; “[t]o conclude
otherwise ignores the differences between direct and collateral
review.”152
Finally, Justice Wiggins decried the harm resulting from automatic
reversal: “It does not serve the interests of justice to reopen this longdecided case, requiring a young girl to relive old traumas, and granting a
windfall new trial to a man convicted of sexually molesting his
daughter.”153
IV. WASHINGTON OPEN COURTS JURISPRUDENCE REMAINS
UNSETTLED
These four decisions reflect the wide divisions on the Court and the
consequent difficulty of gathering a majority. The analysis of many
common issues is thus unsettled. Future cases will also be affected by
the changing membership of the Court: the two newest justices have not
yet participated in decisions on open courts questions.
A.

Some Questions Have Been Decided

Certain things are clear. The article I, section 22 public trial right
applies to proceedings usually conducted in open court, including voir
dire.154 If the right applies, a closure occurs when observers are excluded
by clearing the courtroom or by moving proceedings into private

149. Id. at 186, 288 P.3d at 1154 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 178, 288 P.3d at 1150 (Madsen, C.J., dissenting); id. at 185–86, 288 P.3d at 1153–54
(Wiggins, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 180, 288 P.3d at 1151 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 183, 288 P.3d at 1153.
153. Id. at 186, 288 P.3d at 1154.
154. State v. Wise, 176 Wash. 2d 1, 11, 288 P.3d 1113, 1118 (2012); State v. Lormor, 172 Wash.
2d 85, 92, 257 P.3d 624, 628 (2011).
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places.155 Complete exclusion of the public from proceedings in a
courtroom is a closure.156 Inadequate space for both the public and the
jury venire does not justify a closure.157 Wholesale exclusion of the
defendant’s family is a closure.158
On the other hand, the public trial right does not prevent the court
from exercising its discretion to control the courtroom environment; the
exclusion of one person, even a family member, to reduce noise and
possible distractions is not a violation of the right.159 Questioning jurors
one at a time in open court is not a closure even if the remaining venire
is kept elsewhere.160 When the judge meets with counsel in chambers to
consider a question from a deliberating jury about the court’s
instructions, the public trial right is not violated.161 Nor does the right
apply to jury instruction conferences.162
B.

Other Issues Remain Unresolved

Substantive areas that remain uncertain include the scope of the right,
the role of the structural error doctrine, and the impact of the experience
and logic test. These uncertainties are discussed in turn.
1.

Scope of the Right: To Which Proceedings Does the Public Trial
Right Attach?

To answer this question the Sublett Court adopted the U.S. Supreme
Court’s experience and logic test from Press II, which involved closure
of preliminary hearings in California.163 The “experience” prong inquires
whether a proceeding has “historically been open to the press and
general public.”164 Press II found the preliminary hearings to be similar
in nature to probable cause hearings, which are like trials and have
traditionally been open; this satisfied the experience prong.165 The
Washington State Supreme Court thus gave great weight to past
155. See Lormor, 172 Wash. 2d at 92–93, 257 P.3d at 628–29.
156. Id. at 92, 257 P.3d at 628.
157. In re Orange ,152 Wash. 2d 795, 809–10, 100 P.3d 291, 298 (2005).
158. See, e.g., id. at 800–01, 100 P.3d at 293–94.
159. Lormor, 172 Wash. 2d at 96–97, 257 P.3d at 630.
160. State v. Vega, 144 Wash. App. 914, 917, 184 P.3d 677, 679 (2008).
161. State v. Sublett, 176 Wash. 2d 58, 77–78, 292 P.3d at 724–25 (2012).
162. Id. at 75, 292 P.3d at 723.
163. Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press II), 478 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1986).
164. Sublett, 176 Wash. 2d at 73, 292 P.3d at 722.
165. Press II, 478 U.S. at 12–13.

10 - Ellington & Lutzenhiser Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

6/17/2013 1:57 PM

514

[Vol. 88:491

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

practices in handling questions from a deliberating jury.
This presents a puzzle, however. Questioning potential jurors in
chambers is also a practice of long-standing and wide use, but this
history has played no part in the Court’s analysis (and rejection) of the
practice, before or after Sublett.166 We therefore do not know how the
Court will apply the history part of the experience prong.
Under the logic prong, the trial court must determine whether
openness plays “a significant positive role in the functioning of the
particular process in question.”167 The Court has not clarified what the
hallmarks of significance might be, or what is meant by “functioning of
the particular process.” The experience and logic test thus appears to
combine a number of somewhat elastic ideas that will need to be further
developed.
The Court will also have to revisit whether the experience and logic
test can or should be supplemented with other inquiries, because there
does not yet appear to be a majority view on the subject. In Sublett, the
plurality rejected the Court of Appeals’ legal/factual test as inadequate,
standing alone, because it failed to recognize that proceedings often
involve a mixture of content, and the test encourages reliance on labels
rather than substance. This is a fair criticism, but leaves unanswered how
the substance of the proceeding affects the analysis.
2.

What Role Should the Structural Error Doctrine Play? (And What
About Momah?)

One of the most difficult questions is application of the structural
error doctrine, which governs both reviewability and remedy. A
structural error is presumed prejudicial, and requires automatic reversal.
It is to be hoped that the Court will apply this doctrine more cautiously
going forward, for several reasons.
First, the doctrine has federal roots and is only recently part of
Washington case law.168 Traditional federal analysis includes a strong
presumption that constitutional errors are not structural,169 and that
structural errors are rare. As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in

166. See generally State v. Paumier, 176 Wash. 2d 29, 288 P.3d 1126 (2012); State v. Wise, 176
Wash. 2d 1, 288 P.3d 1113 (2012).
167. Press II, 478 U.S. at 8.
168. See State v. Vreen, 143 Wash. 2d 923, 930, 26 P.3d 236, 239 (2001); In re Benn, 134 Wash.
2d 868, 921, 952 P.2d 116, 143 (1998).
169. Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S 212, 218 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted);
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999).
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Arizona v. Fulminante,170 a “structural” error is a “defect affecting the
framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in
the trial process itself.”171 In Neder v. United States,172 the Supreme
Court characterized structural errors as “infect[ing] the entire trial
process,” and depriving defendants of “basic protections” such that “no
criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair.”173 If a
constitutional error is structural, a conviction cannot stand, because such
errors are presumptively and irrebuttably prejudicial.174 In Washington v.
Recuenco,175 the U.S. Supreme Court described the “rare cases” in which
an error will be structural, thus requiring automatic reversal: “In such
cases, the error necessarily renders a criminal trial fundamentally unfair
or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence.”176 Structural
error has been found in cases involving, for example, complete denial of
counsel, coerced confession, racial discrimination in selection of a grand
jury, denial of self-representation at trial, complete denial of public trial,
and defective reasonable-doubt jury instructions.177 But as the Recuenco
Court emphasized, “most constitutional errors can be harmless.”178
Under the U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis, “a constitutional error is
either structural or it is not,”179 and once an error has been determined to
be non-structural the test is:
[W]hether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained . . . . An
otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the
reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that
the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.180
There is nothing in the federal cases to suggest that an open courts
violation is always structural error, and the Washington State Supreme
Court has not explained why a more strict application of the doctrine in
section 22 cases is required by the state constitution.
170. 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
171. Id. at 310.
172. 527 U.S. 1.
173. Id. at 8–9 (internal quotation marks omitted).
174. See id.
175. 548 U.S. 212 (2006).
176. Id. at 218–19 (quoting Neder, 527 U.S. at 8).
177. Id. at 219 n.2 (collecting cases).
178. Id. at 218 (internal quotation marks omitted).
179. Neder, 527 U.S. at 14.
180. Id. at 15 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986)).
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Second, the Court has not been consistent in applying the structural
error doctrine to the public trial right. In Bone-Club,181 Easterling,182 In
re Orange,183 State v. Brightman,184 and Strode,185 the trial court closed
the courtroom (or conducted voir dire in chambers) for a portion of a
criminal trial, each time without benefit of the required balancing of
interests. The Court held that each closure rendered the trial
fundamentally unfair, and was therefore structural error.186
In State v. Momah, however, the trial court, without benefit of a BoneClub inquiry, conducted closed-door questioning of prospective jurors to
prevent tainting the jury pool in a notorious sex crime case.187 Yet the
Court held this error was not structural: “not all courtroom closure errors
are fundamentally unfair and thus not all are structural errors.”188 The
Momah court listed several criteria for distinguishing between public
trial errors that are structural and those that are not:
(1) [W]hether the trial court closed the courtroom based on
interests other than the defendant’s or to safeguard the
defendant’s right to a fair trial; (2) whether the closure impacted
the fairness of the defendant’s proceedings; (3) whether the
defendant was consulted or given the opportunity to object, and
whether the defendant assented to or actively participated in the
closure; and finally (4) whether the record suggests that the
court considered the defendant’s right to a public trial when it
closed the courtroom.189
Momah appears unique. Not only did the Court hold the error not
structural, but it did so by examining the record and deciding for itself
that the closure did not affect the fairness of the trial (and so did not
181. 128 Wash. 2d 254, 906 P.2d 325 (1995) (closing courtroom for testimony of undercover
officer).
182. 157 Wash. 2d 167, 137 P.3d 825 (2006) (closing courtroom for plea negotiation between
prosecutors and codefendant).
183. 152 Wash. 2d 795, 100 P.3d 291 (2004) (closing courtroom to spectators during voir dire).
184. 155 Wash. 2d 506, 122 P.3d 150 (2005) (closing courtroom to spectators during voir dire).
185. 167 Wash. 2d 222, 217 P.3d 310 (2009) (closing courtroom to spectators during voir dire).
186. See id. at 231, 217 P.3d at 316 (citing Bone-Club, Easterling, and Orange for the proposition
that “denial of the public trial right is deemed to be a structural error and prejudice is necessarily
presumed”); see also State v. Momah, 167 Wash. 2d 140, 150–51, 217 P.3d 321, 326–27 (2009)
(citing Bone-Club, Easterling, Orange, and Brightman as cases where the closure errors were held
to be structural). For a detailed discussion of Momah and Strode, decided by the Court the same
day, see Lutzenhiser, supra note 4, at 1229–32.
187. 167 Wash. 2d at 145–47, 217 P.3d at 323–25.
188. Id. at 150, 217 P.3d at 326.
189. State v. Paumier, 176 Wash. 2d 29, 47, 288 P.3d 1126, 1135 (2012) (Wiggins, J., dissenting)
(citing Momah, 167 Wash. 2d at 151–52, 217 P.3d at 326–27).
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constitute structural error).190 In subsequent cases, however, the Court
has undertaken no such examination of the record. Nor has it applied the
criteria enumerated in Momah. But the Court has not overruled
Momah.191
Third, the Wise/Paumier rule that failure to conduct a Bone-Club
inquiry is itself structural error is a new development. It is one thing to
apply the structural error doctrine to a constitutional error such as an
unjustified closure. It is another thing to apply the structural error
doctrine to a failure to determine on the record whether the closure is
constitutionally justified. This rule elevates the Bone-Club analysis to an
independent constitutional right and eliminates any review of the merits
of the closure decision whenever the Bone-Club balancing is absent.
The court has not clearly explained why (for example) in-chambers
questioning of selected prospective jurors, on sensitive subjects and at
their request, falls into the class of constitutional errors that infect the
entire trial, such as the complete denial of counsel, coerced confession,
racial discrimination in selection of a grand jury, denial of selfrepresentation at trial, or defective reasonable-doubt jury instructions. It
is therefore even more difficult to see how the failure to articulate a
proper balancing of interests similarly infects the entire trial process, or
deprives defendants of “basic protections” such that “no criminal
punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair.”192
Whether the new rule has significant practical effect will depend upon
whether closures continue to occur without a Bone-Club analysis. And in
future cases, that will depend, at least in part, upon whether the Court
can clearly define the scope of the public trial right.
3.

What Is the Impact of the Experience and Logic Test?

Under the experience prong of the test, historical practice matters. A
survey of what Washington judges have done “at chambers” since
190. Momah, 167 Wash. 2d at 151–56, 217 P.3d at 326–29.
191. The leading opinions have instead distinguished Momah as factually unique. See, e.g., State
v. Wise, 176 Wash. 2d 1, 14–15, 288 P.3d 1113, 1119–20 (2012). This approach has been
challenged, especially by Chief Justice Madsen. See id. at 24, 288 P.3d at 1124 (Madsen, C.J.,
dissenting); State v. Sublett, 176 Wash. 2d 58, 119–20, 292 P.3d 715, 745 (2012) (Madsen, C.J.,
concurring). With the exception of Momah, the Court has extended the structural error doctrine not
only to all violations of the public trial right, but to all cases where no Bone-Club analysis was done,
regardless of whether or not there was an actual violation of the right and whether or not actual
prejudice resulted. See supra Part III.B. This has meant a costly train of retrials for courts,
prosecutors, and defense attorneys. For witnesses and victims, reliving the crime at a new trial is a
high cost indeed.
192. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1999).
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statehood (and thus the earliest days of sections 10 and 22) reveals that
in-chambers conferences to discuss even legal matters have long been
seen as constitutional and within the discretion of the trial judge.193 Until
Sublett, however, history did not appear to have a role in the analysis,
particularly considering that chambers questioning of potential jurors is
a practice of very long standing. The new experience and logic test calls
for review of historical practices. Yet it seems unlikely that the Sublett
Court’s adoption of the test signals a shift in the voir dire cases. What
then is the role of the history inquiry?
a.

What Is the Breadth of the Sublett Rule?

The Sublett chambers conference involved a deliberating jury’s
question about its instructions on the law. The Court’s analysis was
specific to that situation. Does the Sublett rule permit chambers
consideration of all questions from a deliberating jury, such as questions
about evidence, or is it limited to questions about the court’s
instructions? What analytical path is to be used for a different sort of
question? What if the court and counsel all have new trials underway
and cannot be physically present where the jury is deliberating—can
they resolve the issue on the telephone, which has been a frequent
practice? By email? What about consideration of questions from the jury
during trial? If jurors are permitted to submit proposed questions for
witnesses, may counsel and the court confer in chambers to decide
which questions should be asked?
It was important to the Sublett Court’s analysis that a court rule
directed the process and protected the record. The Court viewed the rule
as serving to advance and protect the constitutional requirements of open
courts. It will likely be a rare case in which a rule applies to protect
section 22 interests. What is the importance of the rule in the analysis?
b.

What About Chambers and Sidebar Conferences?

Chambers conferences have long been used to resolve procedural
(and sometimes substantive) issues, because they are efficient and
productive. The defendant is normally not present. Do such conferences
implicate a defendant’s public trial right (or the public’s right to open
193. See generally In re Ticeson, 159 Wash. App. 374, 384–85, 246 P.3d 550, 555–56 (2011),
abrogated on other grounds by Sublett, 176 Wash. 2d at 71–72, 292 P.3d at 721–22. Ticeson was a
matter of a Sexually Violent Predator commitment trial, and thus was a civil, not criminal
proceeding. However, the closure questions the court discussed were similar to those at issue in the
criminal context. Id. at 379–80, 246 P.3d at 553.
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access)? Does the answer depend upon the nature of the discussion?
Does it depend upon whether trial is actually underway?
Similarly, common practice has been to address certain types of trial
issues in a quiet sidebar conference without dismissing the jury.194 For
example, the judge may wish to address counsel about specific lines of
questioning or scheduling. Or counsel may wish to advise the court that
an issue is about to surface, or reveal that a party has an urgent need for
a recess, or state the basis for an objection. These issues may often be
efficiently and fairly handled at sidebar; if the sidebar proves inadequate
a recess can be taken. The alternative is to excuse the jury every time the
judge wishes to address, question, or admonish counsel, or hear a fuller
explanation of an objection. But this disrupts jurors’ concentration and
leaves them frustrated by their own exclusion from the proceedings. (It
also results in a significant loss of time, especially where jury rooms are
not adjacent to courtrooms.) Is a sidebar closure? Does it matter what
issue is discussed, or whether a record is made?
c.

What Are the Limits of the Trial Judge’s Discretion?

The Court will also have to decide where the line falls between the
administration of a trial and the rights of the defendant and the public.
Trial judges have the responsibility to protect the defendant’s public trial
right.195 They also have the responsibility, and inherent and statutory196
authority, to preserve and enforce order in the proceedings before
them.197 Scheduling and order of witnesses; statutory or administrative
empanelment of jurors, including general qualifications and even
194. Trial judges have been increasingly reluctant to conduct such conferences in light of the
unsettled state of the law. Interview by Jeanine Blackett Lutzenhiser with the Hon. Susan
Craighead, King County Superior Court, in Seattle, Wash. (Dec. 1, 2011); Interview by Jeanine
Blackett Lutzenhiser with the Hon. Anne Ellington, Washington State Court of Appeals, in Seattle,
Wash. (Dec. 29, 2011).
195. See, e.g., In re Orange, 152 Wash. 2d 795, 805, 100 P.3d 291, 296 (2005).
196. The Washington Revised Code provides in pertinent part:
Every court of justice has power—(1) To preserve and enforce order in its immediate presence.
(2) To enforce order in the proceedings before it, or before a person or body empowered to
conduct a judicial investigation under its authority. (3) To provide for the orderly conduct of
proceedings before it or its officers. (4) To compel obedience to its judgments, decrees, orders
and process, and to the orders of a judge out of court, in an action, suit or proceeding pending
therein. (5) To control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of
all other persons in any manner connected with a judicial proceeding before it, in every matter
appertaining thereto. (6) To compel the attendance of persons to testify in an action, suit or
proceeding therein, in the cases and manner provided by law. (7) To administer oaths in an
action, suit or proceeding pending therein, and in all other cases where it may be necessary in
the exercise of its powers or the performance of its duties.
WASH. REV. CODE § 2.28.010(1)–(7) (2012).
197. State v. Lormor, 172 Wash. 2d 85, 93–94, 257 P.3d 624, 628–29 (2011).
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hardship not specific to a defendant’s case;198 management of space and
accommodation; whether to permit photographers in the courtroom;199
what security procedures are necessary200—these are matters
traditionally within the discretion of the trial judge. Do these decisions
implicate the public trial right or the public’s right to open access? Does
discussion of these matters in chambers implicate those rights? The
Court has not yet seen a case raising these issues, but its decisions thus
far do not suggest clear lines of analysis.
C.

Where Do the Justices Stand On These Issues?

In light of the plethora of opinions and the recent changes in
membership of the Court, it is useful to examine the justices’ position on
the major issues.201 (The Court’s newest members, Justices González
and McCloud, have not yet heard cases raising these issues.)
1.

Scope of the Public Trial Right

To determine when the right to public trial attaches, Justices Charles
Johnson, Owens and James Johnson would apply the experience and
logic test, but would recognize that the Court of Appeals’ legal/factual
test “somewhat parallels the approach we use.”202 Chief Justice Madsen
believes both tests are useful.203 Justices Stephens and Fairhurst would
apply only the experience and logic test.204 Justice Wiggins rejects the
experience and logic test as unconstitutional.205 Thus six of the justices
will apply the experience and logic test, and four of those justices do not
reject the legal/factual test.

198. See State v. Irby, 170 Wash. 2d 874, 887, 246 P.3d 796, 803 (2011) (Madsen, C.J.,
dissenting) (arguing that excusal of potential jurors for personal reasons such as general hardship is
distinct from true voir dire when the potential jurors are introduced to the substantive legal and
factual issues of a defendant’s case). The U.S. Supreme Court has “expressly distinguished ‘voir
dire’ from the ‘administrative empanelment process.’” Id. at 888, 246 P.3d at 803 (citing Gomez v.
United States, 490 U.S. 858, 874 (1989)). See also Lutzenhiser, supra note 4, at 1236–37.
199. State v. Russell, 141 Wash. App. 733, 741, 172 P.3d 361, 364–65 (2007) (trial court
balanced interests of defendant’s right to public trial with court’s authority to control courtroom
photography under GR 16).
200. State v. O’Connor, 155 Wash. App. 282, 293, 229 P.3d 880, 884 (2010).
201. See Table 1: Open Courts Cases 2009–2012: Voting Alignments and Opinions.
202. State v. Sublett, 176 Wash. 2d 58, 72–73, 292 P.3d 715, 722 (2012).
203. Id. at 98–99, 292 P.3d at 735 (Madsen, C.J., concurring).
204. Id. at 136, 292 P.3d at 753 (Stephens, J., concurring).
205. Id. at 145–50, 292 P.3d at 758–60 (Wiggins, J., concurring).

10 - Ellington & Lutzenhiser Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

2013]
2.

6/17/2013 1:57 PM

WASHINGTON’S OPEN COURTS JURISPRUDENCE

521

Structural Error

All the justices hold unjustified closure to be constitutional error.
They are divided on the issue of structural error.206 Justices Owens,
Fairhurst, and Stephens hold that an unjustified closure is always
structural error and that failure to conduct a Bone-Club inquiry is itself
structural error. Chief Justice Madsen and Justices Wiggins, Charles
Johnson, and James Johnson do not agree.
3.

Review and the Rules of Appellate Procedure

Chief Justice Madsen and Justices James Johnson, Charles Johnson,
and Wiggins would apply RAP 2.5(a)(3) to determine reviewability on
appeal where a closure issue was not raised at trial, and Chief Justice
Madsen would undertake an examination of the record (or an enhanced
record) to determine whether the closure was justified. Justices Owens,
Fairhurst, and Stephens believe application of RAP 2.5 is improper
because it amounts to treating silence as waiver, and also reject appellate
examination of the record to determine whether the closure was
justified.207 Justices Wiggins, Charles Johnson, and James Johnson do
not comment on this issue.
CONCLUSION
In admirable understatement, Justice Chambers observed (in his brief
concurrence in Morris) that “[t]his court’s jurisprudence regarding
public trials under article I, sections 10 and 22 is still developing.”208
Chief Justice Madsen made similar observations, closing her Sublett
concurrence with a series of questions addressed to the Court as a
whole.209 Because every criminal case may present these issues, further

206. See supra Part III.B.
207. “We do not comb through the record or attempt to infer the trial court’s balancing of
competing interests where it is not apparent in the record.” State v. Wise, 176 Wash. 2d 1, 12–13,
288 P.3d 1113, 1118 (2012).
208. In re Morris, 176 Wash. 2d 157, 173, 288 P.3d 1140, 1148 (2012) (Chambers, J.,
concurring).
209. Sublett, 176 Wash. 2d at 135, 292 P.3d at 753 (Madsen, C.J., concurring) (“[M]ust we
adhere to the harsh rule we have set up that the mere failure to make the inquiry is a constitutional
violation of the worst kind, mandating reversal of the defendants’ convictions and reversals for new
trials? Will we continue to disregard our own Rules of Appellate Procedure, giving them effect only
in word, and not substance, when the public trial right cases come before us? . . . [I]t is possible to
give all aspects of the public trial right and all aspects of our appellate rules effect. Will we do
so?”).
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guidance from the Supreme Court is sorely needed so as to avoid the
dire consequences of retrials. For the sake of courts, victims, defendants,
and public confidence, it is to be hoped the views of the justices will find
harmony in the next round.
TABLE 1: OPEN COURTS CASES 2009–2012: VOTING ALIGNMENTS AND
OPINIONS
Case

Holding

Morris

Reversed

Majority/

Concur.

Concur.

Concur.

1

2

3

Plurality

(2012)

Owens

Wiggins
C. Johnson
J. Johnson

Alexander,
JPT
Reversed

Madsen

Stephens

dire)

(2012)

Dissent 2

Fairhurst

(closed voir

Paumier

Chambers

Dissent 1

Owens

Madsen

Wiggins

Chambers

C. Johnson

Fairhurst

J. Johnson

(closed voir

Stephens

dire)

Alexander,
JPT

Wise

Reversed

(2012)

Owens

Madsen

C. Johnson

Fairhurst

Wiggins

(closed voir

Stephens

dire)

Alexander,
JPT
C. Johnson

Stephens

Wiggins

(2012)

Chambers

Fairhurst

(result)

(chambers

Owens

Alexander,

conf.

J. Johnson

JPT

Sublett

jury Q)

Affirmed

for

J. Johnson

Chambers

Madsen

10 - Ellington & Lutzenhiser Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

2013]

6/17/2013 1:57 PM

WASHINGTON’S OPEN COURTS JURISPRUDENCE

523

TABLE 1 continued
Case

Lormor

Holding

Affirmed

(2011)

Majority/

Concur.

Concur.

Concur.

Plurality

1

2

3

Dissent 1

C. Johnson
Alexander
Madsen

(exclusion of

J. Johnson

distracting

Chambers

family

Owens

member)

Fairhurst
Stephens
Wiggins

Momah

Affirmed

(2009)

C. Johnson

Penoyar,

Alexander

Madsen

JPT

Sanders

Owens
(closed voir

Fairhurst

dire)

J. Johnson

Chambers

Penoyar,
JPT
Strode
(2009)

(closed voir
dire)

Reversed

Alexander

Fairhurst

C. Johnson

Sanders

Madsen

Penoyar,

Chambers

JPT

Owens

J. Johnson

Dissent 2

